

currency boards solve all, always. But I do think that they are the best alternative for Russia and the other ex-Communist states. Are they likely? I believe that some attempts will be made to prepare the way for a currency-board system—rather like the reforms we have seen in Poland since January 1990. I fear, however, that—again as in Poland—the reform will attempt to maintain the state's monopoly of the money supply and will not set up the hard ruble as a *parallel* currency. It will, so to speak, harden up the existing soft ruble.

### The Deficit Factor

**L**IKE the zloty reform in Poland, this will take the form of first declaring convertibility and then pegging the existing ruble to (say) the dollar at (say) 200 to provide a “nominal anchor” for the currency. If this exchange rate is held through hell and high water, then ultimately there will be stability somewhere near the inflation rate of the United States. The trouble is that this requires a most restrained rate of expansion in the quantity of rubles issued. But this requirement will be quite inconsistent with the need for the governments to print rubles to cover their horrendous budget deficits. Ah, you may say, this misses the fact that the rhetoric of the reforms requires low and manageable deficits. Indeed the IMF insists on such. But the reforms also insist on the great state-owned enterprises being subject to market discipline—and this will mean erstwhile surpluses are converted into swinging losses; and a very large component of public revenue, the taxes on such surpluses, will disappear. The sharp decline of output, always so far associated with the first years of reform, will also balloon the budget deficit. (Is it really necessary to argue here in the United States that all budget deficits are bigger than expected?)

If one retains only the newly hardened ruble (200 to the dollar) and the government has to print a large amount of money to cover the deficit, then there will be too many rubles and eventually the currency will have to be depreciated. Once it goes soft its “as good as a dollar” reputation will be gone. It is, of course, *possible* to avoid printing money to cover deficits. The government could borrow, or it could

receive “donations” (aid) from a grateful West anxious to conclude a “grand bargain.” Alas, the CIS credit ratings are low and are unlikely to improve. And it is unlikely that the West will double the amount donated to the Third World (about \$35 billion) to provide what the lobbyists for the “grand bargain” think is appropriate to bail out the former Soviet Union (about 5 per cent of Russia's GNP, or \$100 per capita for five years).

I conclude that it is good policy to keep the old inflating ruble, freely

floating in a free market, to enable the government to cover its obligations. I believe it would also be useful in avoiding the shock implied in hardening the existing ruble. The parallel hard and soft rubles would ease the transition to a free and open market economy.

Finally, it is worthy of note that Keynes's new ruble was a parallel currency. So I conjecture that Keynes would have approved of the reincarnation of his currency boards. After all it worked in 1918; why not in 1992? □

## Homosexuality and Genetics

# WHAT IS NORMAL?

If something is heritable, can it be called abnormal?  
But is homosexuality heritable?

STEVEN GOLDBERG

**I**N RECENT WEEKS the media have given wide exposure to the work of Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard. This coverage was justified. Bailey and Pillard provide powerful evidence for an hereditary component to homosexuality. While such a component has long been suspected, this work is the strongest argument for its existence.

However, the reports have almost universally misunderstood the meaning of Bailey and Pillard's conclusions as they relate to the question of psychological normality or abnormality. The reports have interpreted the conclusions as effectively demonstrating the normality of homosexual behavior. This is incorrect.

In essence, Bailey and Pillard conclude that, to the extent that homosexuality is innate, it should be considered a psychologically normal variation. This is certainly reasonable; it would be an exercise in pointless

cruelty to assess as “abnormal” a behavior that, unlike hereditary blindness or an uncontrollable impulse to violence, is not inherently damaging to oneself, others, or society.

However, there is a crucial distinction that Bailey and Pillard did not make, a distinction between a predispositional and a *determinative* physiological factor. The latter would be a factor that generated basic sexual orientation *regardless of the environment in which the individual grew*.

Such a factor *would* render indefensible and cruel any assessment of homosexuality as psychologically abnormal. It would do so in the same way that such a factor renders discrimination on the basis of basic skin color indefensible and cruel. This is an analogy often used by spokesmen for the homosexual community; but the spokesmen invariably *assert* that which must be demonstrated—that homosexuality is, like basic skin color, the result of a physiologically *determinative* factor. Bailey and Pillard's own evidence argues against there being such a factor that causes much homosexuality.

Bailey and Pillard report that in half the cases of male identical twins

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of whom one is homosexual, the other is homosexual as well, while in only a fifth of the cases of male *non-identical* twins of whom one is homosexual is the other homosexual. (A tenth of the male population—and of pairs of male identical twins—is homosexual.) This certainly does indicate the importance of heredity, but it just as strongly indicates the importance of environment: in half the cases of male identical twins of whom one was homosexual, the other was *not*; since identical twins have identical genetic make-up, this homosexuality *must* be the result of environmental factors. (Whether this environmental element is a fetal accident, a family of the sort described by the Freudians, or something different is beside the point.) It is only when *both* twins are homosexual that it *could* be the case that the homosexuality is caused by an hereditary *determinative* factor (i.e., a factor that is sufficient to cause homosexuality no matter what the environment).

Now, the fact that a) when one identical twin is homosexual, the other is homosexual in 50 per cent of the cases, but b) when one non-identical twin is homosexual the other is homosexual in only 20 per cent of the cases, strongly suggests a physiological element—perhaps a physiological necessary condition. But this does *not* imply (and Bailey and Pillard do not claim that it implies) that it is ever the case that heredity alone is capable of generating homosexuality whatever the environment. The reason is that identical twins share a much more nearly identical familial environment than do non-identical twins; non-identical twin brothers are virtually as different physically and mentally as are non-twin brothers, and, as a result, their interactions with their parents are as different as are those of non-twin brothers. Thus, the 50 versus 20 per cent could well be, at least in part, a function of the difference in familial environment of identical and non-identical twins.

Indeed, one could argue, though I would not, that this leaves open the possibility that heredity plays *no* role. This view would argue that environment *alone* accounts for the homosexuality of the twin with the non-homosexual identical twin brother and also the homosexuality of the twins who are both homosexual (and who shared an environment as nearly identical as

was their shared heredity). Finally, this view would account for the 50–20 differential entirely in terms of the fact that identical twins have far more similar environments than do non-identical twins.

Having raised this possibility, I would quickly add that I do so for logic's sake and that I find it much more plausible that the differential is usually owing to one non-identical twin's meeting the physiological necessary condition and the other's failing to have this physiological factor.

The important point here is that Bailey and Pillard's work—which is of the utmost importance in its suggestion that there is an hereditary psychological *facilitator* for homosexuality—does not demonstrate, and the authors do not claim that it demonstrates, that homosexuality is ever caused by heredity *alone*. Their work does strongly indicate, however, that heredity does play a role and that the stronger the hereditary factor, the less “environmental push” is required.

Much of the complexity we have discussed falls away if we think of the hereditary element as quantitative, not qualitative—as rendering homosexuality more or less likely in a given environment. This is what Bailey and Pillard do, and it is only for questions of assessing normality that the issue of an hereditary *determinative* factor becomes important. The work of Bailey and Pillard tells us that heredity is very important and that some males are likely to become homosexual with only a slight “environmental push,” while others are not likely to become homosexual even in a strongly “homosexuality-producing environment” (whatever that should turn out to be). It may or may not be the case that some individuals will not become homosexual *no matter what* their environments. The work of Bailey and Pillard does not tell us this.

Incidentally, there is a question whose answer is not clear: Why are 20 per cent of the non-identical twins of homosexuals homosexual when only 10 per cent of the general population is homosexual? Is it that their parents presented a “more than average homosexuality-producing environment,” one that is facilitated by the hereditary tendency of the other twin? Is the 20 per cent simply a coincidence that would not occur if larger numbers of subjects had been used? Since only the


expected percentage of adopted brothers in these families were homosexual, the 20 per cent figure would not seem to be a statistical artifact or one of those surprising, but expected, results inherent in the notoriously tricky world of probability.

### *The Question of Normality*

**T**HUS, the work of Bailey and Pillard does not alter the logic by which homosexuality would be judged to be psychologically normal or abnormal; the assessment must be based on the normality or abnormality of the environmental factors in the causation of the individual's homosexuality.

The Freudian explanation—which stresses the mother's (perhaps justified) contempt for an overly passive or overly aggressive father and the son's resulting refusal to accept the male role—is now often simply asserted away, not because it has been refuted, but for psychological and ideological reasons. What Bailey and Pillard do indicate is that the factors stressed by the Freudian are not often *sufficient* to cause homosexuality. Male A, low in the physiological predisposing factor, is highly unlikely to become a homosexual even if his parents are a Freudian nightmare. Male B, having a strong hereditary predisposition, will need only the slightest familial push to become a homosexual. Thus, the homosexuality of the son is not a clear measure of the environmental contribution of the parents, a fact that should reduce the guilt of even those parents who accept the questionable assumption that parental guilt is justified when there is a parental environmental contribution.

This does not, however, cast doubt on the Freudian explanation. The Freudians do not claim that those who encounter the Freudian environment will usually become homosexual, but rather that those who become homosexual will usually be found to have encountered the Freudian familial environment. (One who says that most nuclear physicists went to college is not saying that most people who went to college became nuclear physicists.) The Freudian is analogous to the allergist who determines that a patient's symptoms are the result of a bee sting; the allergist is not denying that most people—not being allergic to bees—



"Now you've done it, Mermelstein, creating life in a test tube! Another single-parent family!"

will not suffer these symptoms; he is merely saying that those who suffer these symptoms would not have been likely to suffer them had they not been stung by bees.

### Weighing the Factors

**T**O OVERSIMPLIFY slightly (by treating the physiological factor as a necessary condition rather than as a facilitator): Homosexuality can be conceived as a series of "go"/"no go" steps, with a "go" required at every step if homosexuality is to develop. A person who lacks the physiological necessary condition (if there is such a condition), will not become a homosexual no matter what his subsequent environment. Another person, who meets the physiological necessary condition, will not become a homosexual if he encounters one series of environments, but will if he encounters another. This is now the implicit view of virtually all researchers who offer causal explanations of homosexuality.

There are many attempts to describe the environmental component. Alone among these, the Freudian view is complete in that—assuming we take the parents as givens—it does not raise further questions. Explanations stressing a childhood aversion to rough-and-tumble play, first childhood or adolescent sexual experience, being "labeled" a homosexual, and the like—while possibly identifying contributory factors—fail to explain why there is the aversion to rough-and-tumble

play, why the first experiences are disproportionately often homosexual, or why the individual exhibits the behavior that makes labeling possible.

Completeness is, of course, worthless if a theory is incorrect. But virtually all alleged refutations of the Freudian explanation are based on studies using a less discriminating methodology than that supporting the Freudian. (It is worth noting that the studies I refer to as supporting the Freudian view are not therapeutic studies or others about which the non-Freudian is justifiably dubious; they are more discriminating studies of the type used by those who incorrectly claim to refute them.) A non-null finding is *not* refuted by a null finding of a study using a less discriminating methodology; the usually correct explanation for the disagreement is that the former study used a methodology capable of discriminating what it was looking for and the latter did not. E.g., if you measure men and women with a ruler capable of measuring to the nearest inch and I do the same with a ruler capable of measuring only to the nearest yard, you will correctly conclude that men are taller, while I will not.

There is one environmental factor that, as homosexual spokesmen have demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt, cannot explain an American's homosexuality: positive societal sanction. That is, even if it were true (which it is not) that some societies positively sanctioned general adult

male homosexuality, this would not explain an American's homosexuality. There is nothing inherently abnormal about preferring peanuts to popcorn, but, if a society ostracized peanut eaters and rewarded popcorn eaters, one would ask what caused the peanut eater to risk ostracism.

Now: questions of psychological normality are always in part non-scientific. They are scientific questions in that their answers depend on an understanding of causes and functions of the behavior if an assessment of its normality is to be made. They are non-scientific questions in that such an assessment is being made.

Thus, one can invoke the non-scientific aspect to reject the very act of making an assessment of normality. But this encounters two fatal problems.

1. Such a denial forces one to deny *all* assessments of normality, not merely of homosexuality, but also of coprophilia, necrophilia, and a host of other behaviors not clearly harmful to oneself, others, or society. Obviously, this is not what the homosexual spokesman wants. He does not want an absurd, if logically defensible, denial of the validity of the very concept of normality, but an acknowledgment that homosexuality is normal, while the other behaviors are not. To do this, he must reject the opportunity to deny the validity of all assessments of normality and he must be able to demonstrate that the Freudian is incorrect in his explanation of homosexuality.

2. More important to the happiness of the homosexual is an answer to this question: Is the greater frequency in homosexuals of depression, general unhappiness, and other undeniably undesirable tendencies a function only of social ostracism or also, perhaps primarily, of factors inherent in the development of homosexuality? At one time, homosexual spokesmen denied that there was any difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals other than in choice of sexual partner. This argument was surrendered even before the evidence required because it ignored the fact that it is only the negative *effects* of social sanctions that would lead anyone to be bothered by such sanctions.

One major study attempted to answer the question by studying societies with varying attitudes toward homosexuality. It found that the degree

of tolerance was unrelated to the rates of depression, unhappiness, and the like. Astonishingly, the authors of this study concluded that this demonstrates that tolerance is not enough; equal acceptance is required if the rates of pathology are to decline. This is logically possible, but as improbable as a logical conclusion can be. What this evidence far more plausibly seems to imply is that social ostracism has little to do with the correlated behavior (which is a function of the same processes—whatever they are—that generate the homosexuality). And if this is the case, discovery of the environmental causal mechanism might well render possible the alleviation of

the pathological companions of the homosexuality.

Assuming that knowledge of a determinative *physiological* causal factor would also permit alleviation of the pathological companions of the homosexuality, I too wish that there were a physiologically *determinative* factor, one that would refute the Freudian explanation and all explanations in which environment plays a role. Such a finding would demolish all attempts to term homosexuality “abnormal.” But wishing does not make it so, and evidence like that provided by Bailey and Pillard indicates that such a physiologically determinative factor will not be found. □

Communist side. The FMLN leaders saw Violeta Chamorro win an election in Nicaragua, watched Soviet policy begin to give up on adventurism in Central America, and finally witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Soon after Leninism collapsed in Moscow, it collapsed in San Salvador, and the FMLN signed on the dotted line. Now they will try their luck at the ballot box, where they can be expected to get enough votes to put their aging leaders into congressional seats, but not enough to win power. The fiercest debate within the FMLN today may be about what to call their new political party in the next elections, now that phrases like the “People’s Liberation Front” are passé.

Skeptics look across the border at the continuing instability in Nicaragua and wonder if the Salvadoran agreement will prove any better. It will, for the great flaw in Nicaragua is that the Sandinistas still control the army and police. With their monopoly on force, they have a veto on Mrs. Chamorro’s moves and have often killed opponents who threatened their hold on power. In El Salvador, the government maintains the monopoly on force, and the FMLN will be forced to rely on peaceful protests. It must integrate itself into the country’s new democratic system if it is to have any influence at all.

## Peace in El Salvador

# AN AMERICAN VICTORY

The general end of the cold war contributed, but so did a specific and steadfast Reagan policy.

ELLIOTT ABRAMS

**T**HE PEACE treaty signed by the government of El Salvador with the Communist FMLN constitutes a great victory for Salvadorans, and for U.S. foreign policy.

In January 1981, just before Ronald Reagan took office, Jimmy Carter junked his foolish Central American policy. Reacting to continuing Sandinista subversion of neighboring El Salvador, Carter suspended U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua and ended his cut-off of U.S. military aid to El Salvador. Carter recognized that without U.S. help, El Salvador could fall to a small, armed Communist group just as Nicaragua had fallen in 1979.

Reagan policy in El Salvador had two parts. First, the FMLN had to be prevented from achieving a military victory over the government. A large military-aid program was established, with the aim of increasing the size and competence of the Salvadoran army. Second, political reform was needed in

the country, to prove to its citizens that their grievances—against corruption, injustice, oppression—could be redressed within the system. Both parts succeeded. It became clear that the FMLN would never achieve a military victory, as their colleagues in Nicaragua had done, and successive elections in El Salvador began to produce a more open political system. Military rule was replaced by the government of an elected reformist president, José Napoleón Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party. Ultimately, the Christian Democrats were defeated in free elections, largely because of public revulsion at their corruption, and replaced by the conservative ARENA party. The Bush Administration maintained the Reagan policy, providing military aid and supporting democratic politics. As in the Reagan years, the Administration has had to fight off the Democrats in Congress, whose desire to slash aid to El Salvador has long been the FMLN’s only hope.

Meanwhile, the worldwide “correlation of forces” was turning against the

## Another Sort of Foreign Aid

**O**F COURSE, the FMLN will not be without resources in the U.S. and in Europe. Every time the Communists lose an election, there will be plenty of American congressmen prepared to scream “Foul!” and ask for yet another aid cut. When FMLN protests turn violent, as they are bound to do sooner or later, there will be plenty of editorial writers ready to denounce the government for “overreacting” rather than pin the blame on “demonstrators” using guns. And no doubt there will be enough Swedish and French aid projects to provide cash for FMLN political activities. But in a very few years, El Salvador may be able to slough off much of this foreign advice and cure itself of a terrible disease the Communists inflicted upon it: dependence.

El Salvador in the 1960s and 1970s had a fast-growing economy, and Salvadorans are renowned in Central

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